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The Moti Affair in Papua New Guinea 
 
 
 
Itself a minor matter in international affairs, the arrest, detention and escape of Julian 
Moti in Papua New Guinea revealed something of the relationships between three 
nations, the subsequent inquiry in Papua New Guinea provided evidence of the 
performance of institutions and elected and appointed officers, and the affair’s knock-
on effects still reverberate. 
 
As with previous occasional revelations – such as the Commission of Inquiry into 
Papua New Guinea Forestry, (the Thos Barnett Inquiry) of 1987-89, Ombudsman 
reports into violations of the Leadership Code, and evidence given before public 
accounts committee – the PNGDF Board of Inquiry into Moti’s arrest and escape 
provides outsiders with frank information into the way the government works.1 Given 
little research by social scientists on contemporary government in Papua New Guinea, 
the absence of sustained investigation by the media (but revealing immediate 
reporting) and few people engaged in serious public debate, the publication of insider 
testimony and informed scrutiny is all the more valuable. Understanding how the 
government works is basic to – and often missing in – debates about labelling the state 
‘weak’, ‘fragile’, ‘at risk’ or ‘failing’. Knowledge of government processes and the 
behaviour of officers is basic to any reform programs: it helps determine what needs 
to be done and what is possible. 
 
In August 2006 a car owned by former Federal Court judge and current barrister, 
Marcus Einfeld, was photographed speeding in Mosman. Einfeld said that his silver 
Lexus was being driven by Teresa Brennan, a visitor from the United States. But 
when it was found that Brennan had died three years earlier, Einfeld was soon in 
trouble over other traffic offences and faced serious charges including perjury.2 An 
apparent scandal in Sydney, and an engrossing matter within legal circles, had its 
impact on Solomon Islands where Einfeld was been appointed to chair an inquiry into 
the April 2006 riots in Honiara. When Einfeld withdrew, Solomon Islands Prime 
Minister Manasseh Sogavare moved to replace the attorney general, Primo Afeau, 
with Julian Moti, a Fiji-Indian by background and an Australian lawyer by training 
and citizenship. Sogavare was seen by his opponents in Solomon Islands and some 
Australian observers as attempting to use Moti to oversee the terms and conduct of his 
riot inquiry to shift blame to the Australian directed Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and away from the two members of parliament (Charles 
Dausabea and Nelson Ne’e) who were gaoled for their involvement in the riots.3 In 
Solomon Islands there were reservations about appointing Moti who had been ordered 
out of the country for a previous engagement in politics and he was said he have a 
professional association with one of the gaoled members of parliament. Transparency 
Solomon Islands and the Bar Association opposed Moti’s appointment as attorney 
general.4 After the Australian Federal Police issued a warrant for Moti’s arrest for an 
                                               
1
  Reports of inquiries are not, of course, representative: disasters, crimes and gross impropriety and 
neglect generate inquiries; success rarely. 
2
  smh.com.au/national,  30 March 07. 
3
  radioaustralia.nat.au/pacbeat/stories/s1722243.htm. 
4
  Smh.com.au/news, 7 May 2007; radioaustralia.netau/pacbeat. 
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alleged child sex offence in Vanuatu in 1997, Sogavare saw a deliberate plan by 
Australia to frustrate his attempts to set up a separate inquiry, and he appealed to 
arguments about Solomon Islands’ sovereignty and prejudice against a big and distant 
Australian bully. 
 
Acting on an Interpol alert triggered by Australia, the Port Moresby police arrested 
Moti on 29 September 2006 in the transit lounge of Jackson’s airport when he was 
flying from Singapore to Honiara. The Central Province and National Capital District 
police chief, Tony Wagambie, said his officers had acted appropriately in carrying out 
the arrest and he was surprised when told to free Moti on bail. But before he could act, 
Wagambie said, Moti had already gone.5 He had been released on bail and was 
thought to have gone to the Airways Hotel. But he did not appear as required in court 
on Monday 2 October for the initial proceedings leading to his facing the Australian 
case for extradition. For some time the public did not know where Moti had gone, 
then it was learnt he was holed up in the Solomon Islands High Commission in Port 
Moresby. As reported by the National Broadcasting Corporation and the two national 
dailies, the Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare advocated the release and transfer of 
Moti and punishing the police who arrested him.6 Somare’s reported words were 
explicit: ‘Let Moti go’ and ‘my view was to make sure that he gets past our system 
and goes through [to Honiara]’.7  On Monday 9 October the only operational PNGDF 
CASA aircraft took off from Jackson’s airport and dropped Moti and Solomon Island 
officials at a disused airstrip on Munda Island.8 The aircraft and its PNGDF pilots and 
crew were back at Jackson’s early on 10 October. The Civil Aviation Authority had 
no record of the flight, Michael Somare said he was setting up an inquiry in his 
department to find out who had ordered the flight and warned government officers 
against acting without proper written authority. The Solomon Island High 
Commissioner to Papua New Guinea, Bernard Bata’anisia, said he had no knowledge 
and only learnt of the flight after Moti reached Solomon Islands.9 Following a brief 
time when he appeared to be under arrest in Solomon Islands, Moti shifted to a 
Honiara Hotel. 
 
After two tentative investigation, one instigated by the Prime Minister and the other 
by the PNGDF Commander, Peter Ilau, a more substantial and independent inquiry 
into the midnight flight of Moti was in established as a PNGDF Board of Inquiry with 
Justice Gibbs Salika (chair), retired Brigadier General Anthony Huai (deputy chair), 
Daniel Liosi (member) and John Kawi (senior counsel assisting the Board). It was to 
report to the Minister for Defence, Martin Aini, member for Kavieng and a Pangu 
representative in the governing coalition. Evidence given to the Board has been the 
source of most public knowledge in Papua New Guinea, and some of the revelations 
have gone beyond the Moti affair. The late and unofficial release of the 100 page 
Report of the Defence Force Board of Inquiry with its clear and matter of fact 
evaluation of the evidence has added to the amount and credibility of the information 
on the public record.10 
                                               
5
  National, 12 February 07. 
6
  National ,9  February 07. 
7
  Defence Board of Inquiry, pp.29-30. 
8
  It may have been able to operate. It is not cleared as airworthy (National, 12 January 2007). 
9
  National, 11 October 2006. 
10
 Australian, 30 July 07, used the leaked Report in news and feature articles. It then released the full 
Report on its website. 
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While the Defence Force Board of Inquiry was limited in time, initially to just eight 
weeks, its terms of reference were broad, running to some nineteen items, including 
who financed the operation, what accounts were used and were those accounts being 
used appropriately. It is the breadth and detail of the Board’s terms of reference that 
make its report revealing of government behaviour. 
 
The Money Trail 
 
In the process of finding out how K15,000 was released to buy fuel for the CASA, the 
acting first assistant secretary (finance) in the Defence Department told the inquiry 
that when officers asked for travel allowances for local and overseas trips, he was 
expected to approve them without question, and the returning officers rarely acquitted 
accounts.11  Another witness from the Defence Department said that the highest cash 
advance he made to an officer was K10,000 for domestic travel and K20,000 for 
overseas, and the amounts were unrelated to the number of days spent travelling. He 
also said that claims officers were threatened and he agreed that they did not obtain 
acquittals.12 Three other ‘unbudgeted items’ also ‘popped up’ before the Inquiry.13 In 
one, a cheque for K1 million was signed and sent to Intex International, an Australian 
company, for blank ammunition. But it seemed that Intex did not have a licence to 
export ammunition, none had been delivered, and in any case no blank ammunition 
was required as it had been supplied by Australia.14 Some of the key documents 
related to the unbudgeted items went missing in the course of the Inquiry and ‘serious 
threats’ were made against those who gave evidence. Huai said the Inquiry had 
unearthed ‘just the tip of the iceberg’ but would not expose more as these matters was 
outside the Inquiry’s terms of reference.15 Four months later, Defence Department 
Secretary, Fred Punangi, revealed much of the iceberg. Before the Finance Inquiry he 
said that more than K26 million had been lost in fraudulent claims. Within the 
Department, Punangi said, ‘illegal claims had become an industry for fraudsters’.16 
 
In its Report the Board found that one of the relevant accounts, the Directorate of Air 
Operations Account, used by the Air Transport Wing of the PNGDF was set up 
illegally as it had never been approved by the Secretary for Finance, and it had no 
clear guidelines controlling its use. Substantial amounts have been shifted through the 
account, much of it unaccounted for and some of it for purposes outside any 
reasonable interpretation of the proper uses of the account – such as funding a 
meeting in Cairns, maintenance of houses and ‘invalid expenses’.17 Another account, 
the Paymaster’s Imprest Account, was used more carelessly. Not only was it exploited 
to buy the unwanted and unseen blank ammunition and provide the generous 
advances for overseas travel – on top of the normal travel allowance – but was also 
drawn upon for ‘unforseen contingencies such as when [personnel] run out of money 
or to do shopping’. Cash advances were ‘never acquitted’.18 Following the money trail 
                                               
11
  National, 23 January 2007. 
12
  National, 24 January 2007. 
13
  Post-Courier, Weekend 26-28 January 2007. 
14
  Post-Courier, 22 January 2007 
15
  Post-Courier, Weekend 26-28 January 2007. 
16
  National, 16 May 2007. 
17
  Defence Board of Inquiry, pp.58-7. 
18
  Defence Board of Inquiry, pp.61-2. 
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disclosed much about failures in accounting, but little about financing the covert 
operation. 
 
In the Department of Defence those determining where the money went (the 
departmental secretary, his deputy, the first assistant secretary, the cashier, assistant 
secretary accounts, and two budget officers in finance) were, the Board discovered, all 
from the one province and all related. The Board drew a reasonable conclusion: 
‘These officers may have been appointed on their own merits, but the public 
perception could be that the Department of Defence is run by relatives from a certain 
province.’19 The Board also referred to another possible family connection: it was 
suggested that Joseph Assaigo, the Director-General of OSCAR asked a relative and 
colleague in the Office to drive Moti from the Solomon Islands embassy to Waigani 
and then a relative of his drove Moti to Jackson’s Airport.20 The Board was unable to 
confirm that this family transfer of Moti had taken place. 
 
A Conspiracy to Cover the Truth21 
 
Witnesses before the Inquiry gave incomplete, wrong and contradictory evidence. 
Some of this was of minor importance. Assaigo was recalled to give the name of a 
ninth man on the flight to Munda. He said it was his fourteen year-old nephew who 
just happened to be present and was offered a free ride. Assaigo said he did not give 
the information when he first appeared before the Board because he had not been 
asked ‘directly’.22 A fortnight later the ninth passenger on the CASA was thought to 
have been a civilian government officer, but whether he was there with a bag of 
money to pay those on board for services rendered – as suggested by counsel assisting 
the Inquiry – was unclear.23 The Board was unable to name the ninth – adult – on the 
flight. 
 
On the critical question of who gave the instruction for the PNGDF to make the flight, 
Assaigo said that under ‘extreme political pressure’ and directed by the Prime 
Minister’s chief of staff, Leonard Louma, he had instructed Captain Tom Ur, acting 
commander of the PNGDF, to transport Moti to the Solomons.24 He said Louma told 
him that the Prime Minister would speak to him later. Assaigo testified that he sought 
assurance that the Prime Minister and Louma would protect him should the mission 
fail, and Louma said that he would have the Prime Minister’s protection.25 Ur said 
that when he received orders from Assaigo he asked if the Prime Minister was aware 
of the operation, and he was told that he was. After Moti had been delivered to 
Munda, Ur claimed that he told Somare of the operation, and the Prime Minister said 
to leave things to him ‘as it was all political’.26 But the Prime Minister and all those 
around him gave vehement denials of any knowledge of the operation. Punangi, 
Defence Secretary, said he was ‘under no assumption’ that the Prime Minister had 
                                               
19
  Defence Board of Inquiry, p.62. 
20
  Defence Board of Inquiry, p.51. 
21
  The Board suggested that all the main witnesses were in a conspiracy (Defence Board of Inquiry, 
p.84). 
22
  National, 17 January 2007. 
23
  National, 8 February 2007. 
24
  National, 17 January 2007. 
25
  Post-Courier, 21 February 2007. 
26
  Post-Courier, 24 January 2007. 
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given any direct or indirect order.27 Winnie Kiap, secretary to the National Executive 
Council, said that the Council gave no orders.28 Joshua Kalinoe, Chief Secretary, said 
he neither received nor gave any instructions about Moti’s flight and had no prior 
knowledge of it.29 Louma in evidence said he had given no order to Assaigo and to the 
press he denounced Assaigo for his untruths and his attempts to shift responsibility.30 
Although Somare himself declined to appear before the inquiry he provided a sworn 
statement and made several public statements to the press, in parliament and in 
advertisements.31 He claimed that he had told no one to have Moti flown to Solomon 
Islands, neither members of his own staff nor public servants. Somare asked that 
Assaigo be charged with perjury and attacked the Inquiry for being a ‘platform’ for 
the ‘mischievous’ who were ‘disseminating lies’.32 
 
Given the false testimony about a fourteen-year old nephew on the Moti flight and 
much conflicting evidence, it was obvious that lies were being told. With the 
frankness that often marks public debate in Papua New Guinea, Justice Gibbs Salika 
said that after most of the main witnesses had been heard the Inquiry had ‘not come 
an inch closer to the truth’.33 His assisting counsel, Kawi, was more explicit: 
witnesses, he said, could be ‘branded as liars of the highest order. Some of them 
would have qualified for Olympic gold medals for lying’.34 Kawi thought government 
officers should be charged with contempt of court as well as perjury, and the police 
should think about laying charges of conspiracy. When the Board came to evaluate 
the conflicting evidence it decided that Assiago was ‘not truthful’ on the ninth 
passenger, but that he had not acted alone ‘as Louma, Kalinoe, Rongap [office of 
Prime Minister], Kasa [OSCA] and the Prime Minister would have all liked us to 
believe’.35 The Board decided that ten people, from the Prime Minister down, should 
be ‘investigated and charged’ with lying under oath and conspiring to pervert the 
course of justice.36 
 
If the witnesses had a cavalier approach to giving evidence under oath, they also 
showed that Papua New Guinea public office holders could be aggressively 
independent. While this may be taken as evidence of disarray, it also demonstrated 
that government administration is far from dominated by any central authority within 
the public service or the Prime Minister’s office. There has undoubtedly been a rise in 
the power of the Prime Minister’s office, the executive in general and of ministerial 
staffers and public servants who owe appointment to current ministers, but this has 
not led to a controlled hierarchy of decision-making and suppression of the flow of 
information to the public. If there was a conspiracy to fly Moti out of Port Moresby, 
there was certainly no coordination of the response to the Inquiry. Government is 
open in the sense that much information is made public, but this is not the same –as 
Salika said – as getting at the truth or making people accountable. This is in contrast 
to those dictatorships in which conformity is ensured by the threat and reality of 
                                               
27
  National, 25 January 2007. 
28
  Post-Courier, 24 January 2007. 
29
  Post-Courier, 29 January 2007. 
30
  Post-Courier, 21 February 2007. 
31
  National, 16 January 2007; Post-Courier, Weekend edition, 22-5 February 2007. 
32
  National, 16 February 2007. 
33
  National, 18 January 2007. 
34
  National, 22 January 2007. 
35
  Defence Board of Inquiry, p.21. 
36
  Defence Board of Inquiry, pp.84-6. 
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immediate punishment for those who criticise government policy. What has emerged 
are public office holders – including those on the Board of Inquiry – who rarely feel 
any need to moderate blunt language. The exception to this is the solidity of the staff 
closest to the Prime Minister. It illustrates the coherence and strength of that group 
and their commitment to the Prime Minister; but it is possible that the appearance of 
solidity around the Prime Minister is a result that they all (or most) had one truth to 
express – they knew nothing of any order to get Moti out of Port Moresby. But that 
explanation was not one accepted by the Board. 
 
Improper Procedures 
 
In the reporting on the Inquiry and in the Board’s final report there are references to 
numerous violations of laws and procedures. Some infringements were deliberate. 
They were the inevitable result of making a covert flight: no flight plan was 
submitted, no clearance was obtained from Solomon Islands, no lights were shown on 
the aircraft, no radio communication was maintained, no record of passengers was 
prepared before or after the flight, regulations concerning the carrying of civilians on 
military aircraft were ignored and Solomon Islands’ quarantine and migration laws 
were broken. None of the special circumstances allowing a military aircraft to ignore 
civilian regulations – a state of war or emergency –were invoked. More worrying 
were the almost incidental violations that were revealed. The Acting Commander of 
the PNGDF at the time, Colonel Tom Ur, had not been appointed by the head of state 
acting on the advice of the National Executive Council and was therefore  ‘illegally 
occupying the position of Acting Commander’. The deployment of defence force 
personnel outside Papua New Guinea ‘on active military service’ required 
parliamentary approval. (It could not be argued that the defence force was engaged in 
a training exercise, a goodwill tour or a national emergency.) The procedures set 
down for the call-out of the defence force to support civilian power were ignored. The 
acting commander of the defence force failed to provide the required written order 
and he himself acted on the spoken authority of Joseph Assaigo and not that of the 
National Executive Council or Parliament. (Under Defence Force operating 
procedures a covert operation must be covered by a written direction.37) The CASA 
aircraft was not airworthy and had not been so since 2002 when a major service was 
due. Senior commanders have no authority to over-rule the advice of technical 
officers.38 There were several violations of Papua New Guinea and international law 
when Moti was removed while he was under the control of the courts and subject to 
extradition proceedings. The Legal Services Branch of the Defence Force failed to 
offer, and was not asked for, advice. Colonel Vagi Oala was said to command the 
Joint Operations Centre. But the necessary amendments to the Defence Act to 
establish the Centre had not been made or even gone before the National Executive 
Council, and consequently Oala and his staff were occupying positions and receiving 
salaries and allowances ‘illegally’.39 All these were in addition to the failure to 
comply with proper procedures in setting up, using, acquitting and auditing accounts. 
 
Politics and Law 
 
                                               
37
  Defence Board of Inquiry, p.52. 
38
  Defence Board of Inquiry, p.68. 
39
  Defence Board of Inquiry, p.54. 
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Almost from the start, the Board of Inquiry was under legal challenge. The Prime 
Minister and Punangi obtained legal advice that the Board was exceeding its powers 
and advised Defence Minister Aini to suspend the Inquiry immediately.40 In a specific 
request, Punangi asked the Board to ignore witness statements on Defence 
Department administration and financial procedures as these were said to be outside 
the Board’s terms of reference.41 The Prime Minister brought an action to have the 
Board wound up as its creation was not consistent with the Defence Act. The various 
legal attacks on the Board were unsupported by the courts, but on 23 February Somare 
instructed Aini to stop the Inquiry because, he said, it had failed to apply for an 
extension of time and consequently had been operating illegally since 11 February.42 
Although it was soon revealed that Salika had in fact formally asked for an extension, 
by the time this was confirmed the Inquiry was already in the process of completing 
its work with a hastily written report.43 But this did not stop the legal pursuit of the 
Inquiry. In parliament, Somare claimed that the Board had gone beyond what the law 
allowed, and his lawyers went to the National Court with an application to have the 
proceedings of the Inquiry declared void and to have its Report suppressed.44 Also, 
Captain Ur and other senior PNGDF officers brought their own action claiming that 
Salika did not meet the legal criteria for appointment as chair of the Board.45 
Although the Board had presented its report in mid-March, the National Court 
continued to consider the case put by the Defence Force officers and Somare’s claims 
that it was biased, but the mid-year national elections soon dominated the attention of 
politicians, public servants and observers.46  
 
Conclusion 
 
The frequency and persistence of legal action that followed the assembling of the 
Board illustrates the extent to which the courts have become involved in political and 
administrative processes. Much of the recourse to law was not by citizens attempting 
to defend themselves from what they thought was an inquiry putting them at a 
disadvantage, but by one section of government against another: by the Prime 
Minister against an inquiry set up by the Defence Minister and by the Secretary of the 
Defence Department against the terms of the Inquiry. This is asking the courts to 
resolve what should be sorted out by the coalition politicians and their senior public 
servants. In most democracies it would be unthinkable for the courts to be engaged in 
such internecine detail. The result is that the court officials are increasingly seen as 
players in politics at a party and personal level and it is obviously in the self-interest 
of politicians to ensure that judges are sympathetic to their causes and that they get 
cases before courts and officials where they are most likely to get a favourable 
hearing. But while the Inquiry has been diverted and its report delayed by legal action, 
                                               
40
  National, 18 January 2007. 
41
  National, 19 January 2007. The terms of reference (2.9-12) seem to say clearly that the Board would 
try to find out how the operation was funded, if there was any bribery and make a preliminary audit of 
two particular funds. 
42
  Post-Courier, 26 February 2007. 
43
  National, 27 February 2007. At the start of its Report the Board set out a detailed chronology aiming 
to show that those who claimed the Inquiry had run beyond its allotted time were ‘erroneous’, (Defence 
Board of Inquiry, pp.3-4). 
44
  National, 28 February 2007. 
45
  National, 27 March 2007. 
46
  National, 4 May 2007. On 4 May the election period officially began when nominations opened. 
Most electorates were decided by early August 07. 
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no one, including the Prime Minister, has had a quick and easy court victory. The 
courts which considered the cases generated by the Inquiry seem to have retained their 
distance and integrity. Justice Gibbs Salika of the Supreme Court was admirably 
independent in keeping the Inquiry open and the findings, expressed in plain 
language, certainly do not favour the Prime Minister who on the weight of 
probabilities rather than direct evidence was found to have given the order to ‘to get 
rid of Moti’.47 
 
Having failed in the courts to bring about the immediate closing of the Inquiry and the 
voiding of its findings, Somare told the Defence Minister, Martin Aini, to disband it. 
Over the weekend of 24-25 February Aini told the press that he was ‘pressured’ to 
sign the document closing down the Inquiry.48 On the Monday, Aini thought that he 
had been reprimanded for breaking the solidarity of the National Executive Council, 
but the Prime Minister’s daughter and media adviser, Bertha Somare, informed the 
press that Aini had been relieved of his commission as minister, and later Aini himself 
learnt of his sacking. Somare took over the vacant defence portfolio. That meant that 
the Inquiry, already in the process of being wound up, had to submit its report to 
Somare by 28 February. The next day, Somare rejected the preliminary report as ‘sub-
standard’ and gave the Board a verbal extension of ten days to revise and resubmit.49 
Huai assured the public that only the grammar and spelling errors were being 
corrected and that the general content would be unchanged.50 A fortnight later the 
revised report was presented to the Prime Minister and the Board and its staff had 
their wind-up party in a Port Moresby hotel.51 The press claimed that the Report said 
that the Prime Minister through others had directed Joseph Assaigo to ‘get rid of 
Moti’.52 Whatever the Report said, the public was not going to learn about it for a 
long time. The Report was in Somare’s hands, he had the power to suppress or release 
it, and there was still the chance that the court would rule that the Board was biased or 
that Justice Gibbs Salika had not been qualified to chair its deliberations. Although 
rumours of the contents of the Board’s report continued, it was effectively suppressed 
until after polling in the general election. 
 
The setting up of a Board of Inquiry by a Pangu Minister, Aini, into events that 
involve or cross into the responsibilities of other ministers and then his sacking made 
public the problems of forming a united government from a broad coalition. Pangu 
was not prepared to make the loss of Aini’s ministry sufficient cause to leave the 
coalition headed by Somare’s National Alliance, but Sir Rabbie Namaliu, 
parliamentary leader of Pangu, spoke of his disappointment and his confidence that 
Aini had upheld Pangu’s principles of ‘honesty, integrity, transparency …’.53 Pangu 
president, Milo Timini, also praised Aini and he went on to criticise the fact and the 
manner of Aini’s dismissal.54 By then Pangu was positioning itself to have the option 
of entering a new coalition in the next parliament, but even so the openly expressed 
difference between two of the strongest parties in the parliament showed the extent to 
                                               
47
  Defence Board of Inquiry, pp.47-8. 
48
  National, 27 February 2007. 
49
  National, 1 March 2007. 
50
  Post-Courier, 7 March 2007. 
51
  Post-Courier, 19 March 2007. 
52
  Post-Courier, 7 March 2007. 
53
  National, 28 February 2007. 
54
  National, 1 March 2007. 
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which governments in Papua New Guinea are loose and expedient groups rather than 
alliances supporting an agreed policy and ensuring that public statements are 
coordinated. 
 
Those advocating a ‘whole of government’ approach to reform may well be right, but 
they to have to accept the reality that the whole of government is made up of 
divergent parts. Securing the agreement and active cooperation of the prime minister 
is no guarantee that the rest of the government will fall into line, and a minister may 
have only partial control of a department. 
 
It is also obvious that government operates in ways rarely complying with – and little 
influenced - by law or mandatory procedures. When Joseph Assaigo first gave notice 
of the operation to Colonel Tom Ur, acting commander of the Defence Force, he said: 
‘the issue is I got a direction to get rid of the copra bag’.55 He had to explain that the 
‘copra bag’ was Moti. That use of the casual spoken metaphor is about as far as it is 
possible to get from the requirements of the constitution and the Defence Act. Some 
of the violation of procedure is a result of the lack of officers who are competent and 
confident in their professional training – in law, accounting and auditing. Some is a 
result of people from the one place or extended family – as with Moti’s drivers and 
the people controlling the accounts in defence. There is a need for better training, and 
the wantoks, so often found to be a distinctive characteristic of Melanesian 
governance and so often blamed for its deficiencies, can be a problem. But neither a 
lack of training nor wantoks explain much of the indifference to formal regulations. In 
his detailed evidence Assaigo listed a series of spoken communications – on the 
telephone, formal appointments and casual encounters in corridors -  most with just 
vague suggestions about how to get Moti out of the country. The plan seems to have 
been gradually put together by eliminating the impossible (such as using the police 
‘eye in the sky’ helicopter), committing almost nothing to writing on screen or paper, 
and people accepted direction because they knew the person and accepted his 
authority - or knew that he spoke for someone with authority.56 For all the 
indifference to laws and procedures and the apparently casual planning, the covert 
operation was carried out successfully.  
 
The manoeuvre that enabled the Prime Minister to receive and control the report may 
have been politically deft, but it also increased public cynicism. While there was no 
gross violation of law, the conventions that apply in democratic systems were stressed 
if not broken. In the same way other conventions are under pressure - such as the 
independence of the Speaker, the separation of the business interests of members from 
their parliamentary or executive deliberations, and the splitting of parties by the 
government taking in selected members of nominally opposition parties. In the next 
parliament, members will have to arrest the decline in the observation of those 
conventions essential to efficient and fair government while continuing to mould 
inherited practices so that they are more compatible with Melanesian ways and 
aspirations. If they don’t then democratic elections will not ensure the existence of a 
democratic government. 
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  Defence Board of Inquiry, p.10. 
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  Given that this was an inquiry into senior office holders, the absence of documentary evidence 
before the Inquiry is revealing of operating procedures. 
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Once the Australian government learnt that Moti had been flown from Port Moresby 
to Munda, it complained publicly about both Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands 
behaving badly. It certainly had a case, given a midnight flight in defiance of the laws 
and procedures of both governments. More relevant as far as Australia was concerned, 
planning and providing for Moti to break bail violated international agreements about 
the holding and extradition of people named in an appropriate arrest warrant. 
 
Having denounced their behaviour, Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
proceeded to punish Papua New Guineans by banning visits by ministers to Australia 
and forcing the cancellation of meetings. Papua New Guinea responded by claiming 
the Australian reaction was ‘childish and premature’ and Somare, who said he was 
personally untroubled as he had no plans to go to Australia, asked why the head of a 
neighbouring state had to learn through the press about the ban put on him.57 Downer 
was, Somare said, acting like a ‘colonialist’ and his statement was an ‘outburst of a 
foreign minister who still thinks that PNG is a territory’.58 Papua New Guinea recalled 
its High Commissioner to Australia, Charles Lepani, for consultation and the 
commander of the PNGDF, Peter Ilau, who had gone to Australia was told to return. 
 
In the region, the Australian response appeared hectoring and moralistic. In Port 
Moresby and Honiara it increased support for Somare and Sogavare, strengthened 
their informal alliance and did nothing to bring about the results wanted by Australia. 
(The diplomatic note from Solomon Islands government to Papua New Guinea 
requesting the release of the ‘Attorney General’ made a flattering appeal to 
Melanesian brotherhood. It called on Papua New Guinea as ‘the founding country of 
the Melanesian Spearhead Group and our region’s largest nation that has pioneered 
the establishment of a capable and independent Melanesian identity’.59) In the days 
immediately after Moti’s flight and Australia’s response, Melanesians and Australian 
critics used the ready-at-hand slogans. Australia was: big brother, neo-colonial, the 
southern bully, culturally insensitive, without respect for island nation sovereignty ….  
The same slogans will be used again, and while they imply no argument, they reflect 
perceptions which have been strengthened by the Moti affair.60 After six months, the 
Inquiry had come and probably gone, Moti was still in Honiara where he was attorney 
general and strongly supported by Sogavare, the whole affair remained an irritant in 
Australia’s relations with Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, and the bans on 
the ministers travelling to Australia had quietly disappeared. 
 
Incidents such as the Moti affair - like the tearing off of Captain Jenkin’s ear which 
precipitated war between Britain and Spain in 1739 – reveal other and stronger 
movements within and between nations. Much of what happened was disturbing. In 
Papua New Guinea, the officers who admitted involvement in the midnight flight 
were apparently unworried about the lack of a written instruction, the precise origin of 
the order or whether they were violating national and international laws. But those 
failures, easily mistaken for general incompetence, did not mean that the operation – 
inadequately funded and equipped – was itself incompetently carried out. The misuse 
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  www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2006/s1765901.htm; www.australiandefencereport.com.au/10-
06/government_recalls_officers.htm  
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  Defence Board of Inquiry, p.39 
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October 2007. 
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of money – from petty to major corruption - in the Defence Department was rife; 
senior officers contradicted each other before the Inquiry so that it was obvious that 
some lied; the readiness of politicians and officials to resort to litigation resulted in 
delays, shifted the courts into the detail of government business and increased their 
importance and exposure to politicians; and conventions necessary for efficient and 
fair government were ignored. But the corruption, while widespread, is not dominated 
at the centre. Papua New Guinea is not a kleptocracy as that term is used of states 
where the leadership systematically robs its own citizens. In those states the 
leadership does not tolerate the competition of frequent, opportunistic diversion of 
state resources for private gain. The Papua New Guinea courts retained their 
independence in the face of many approaches and cases; the members of the Inquiry 
and assisting counsel were robust and frank to a degree that would surprise most 
observers from western democracies; many witnesses spoke freely (even if not always 
honestly); and the press reported evidence and speculation against the highest in the 
land. As with other inquiries, revelations of misconduct, even where it was blatant, 
rarely led to punishment that forced the guilty from public roles and brought few 
changes in the system.61 Openness may be a condition of good government, but 
openness does not necessarily lead to good government. 
 
It is difficult to characterise this sort of government with its individuals and 
institutions of combative vigour; its many predatory elected and career officers; its 
inefficiencies and indifference to written and unwritten laws; and while it has a 
Melanesian egalitarianism of self-made men, it is also a government of several 
hierarchies and shifting alliances. Observers of governments in the Pacific have 
commented on the influence of patron-client relations and ethnicity. In Pacific 2020 
‘developed’ by AusAID, the authors identify two main causes stultifying the 
efficiency of democratic governments: ‘“clientelism” and fragmentation’. The 
fragmentation is ‘ethnic fragmentation’.62 In what is known and part-known about the 
behaviour of the Papua New Guinea government in the Moti affair there is much 
evidence of fragmentation. The most obvious cases of fragmentation are of a minister, 
a prime minister and a judge heading a board of inquiry acting independently and 
senior officers contradicting each other in their statements to the Board. There is not 
much of this fragmentation that appears to be ‘ethnic’. Where there is evidence of 
closely associated people acting in concert – as in the accounts section of defence - 
the connection between them is one of family rather than ethnicity. The broader 
grouping ‘Sepik’ is mentioned in the Report and officers with their origin in one 
province connect people around the Prime Minister and in other sections of the 
bureaucracy. But to be ‘Sepik’ is to be defined by a place that encompasses several 
cultures, and two of the men who contradict each other, Joseph Assaigo, director-
general, OSCAR, and Joshua Kalinoe, chief secretary, are both from the Sepik and 
were thought of as being ‘Sepiks’.63 Some of the staffers and officers around the 
Prime Minister may be in a client-patron relationship, and it is here that there could be 
a case of a what the Pacific 2020 survey sees as ‘Clientelism and fragmentation 
reinforce[ing] each other’.64 But again this does not extend across much of 
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  Assaigo lost his position, but the Board found him more credible on the main issue than most other 
witnesses. 
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  Pacific 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for Growth, Pacific Affairs Group, AusAID, Canberra, 
2006, p.94. 
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  Defence Board of Inquiry, p.46. 
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government and the coherence and stability of province and patron-client groups is 
open to doubt. One of the simple facts about government in Papua New Guinea is that 
the Prime Minister’s party is likely to have at most a quarter of the seats in the 
parliament. To secure a majority he needs another thirty votes, and while members are 
keen to join the government and share in the prestige and spoils of office, they join the 
government after negotiating an agreement. They may not be equals in government, 
but the Prime Minister needs them. They are less than clients – they act with varying 
degrees of independence, they have their own family, regional and client support, and 
their alliances with the Prime Minister and other groups in the government are not 
permanent. 
 
An observer of Papua New Guinea politics wanting to find examples of patron-client, 
ethnic, district and regional, and family and clan relationships (wantoks) can certainly 
find them, but all have limited explanatory value. These are governments with several 
centres, not of equal strength but allowing degrees of independence and with shifting 
alliances; of judges, public servants and media able to pursue their own lines of 
inquiry and action; and of important decisions and subsequent actions being taken 
without anything being written down and communication often being dependent on a 
chance encounter and instruction being conveyed in understatement or metaphor. If it 
is difficult to describe this sort of government, or to find precedents in Africa and 
Asia, then it is all the more difficult to be certain of its trajectory. 
 
 
